Has the Government Lowered the Hours Worked? Evidence from Japan by Ko, Jun-Hyung
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Has the Government Lowered the Hours
Worked? Evidence from Japan
Jun-Hyung Ko
April 2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/30058/
MPRA Paper No. 30058, posted 28. April 2011 17:52 UTC
Has the Government Lowered the Hours Worked?
Evidence from Japan
Jun-Hyung Ko ¤
April 2011
Abstract
Why does the hours worked show a decreasing pattern in the postwar Japanese
economy? This paper answers this question in the background of the changing
pattern of government spending and tax-imposing behaviors. We construct and
simulate a standard optimal growth model with the following key features: various
taxes and subsidies. Our main ¯ndings are as follows. First, we quantitatively
¯nd that the increasing pattern of taxes on labor income played a crucial role in
in°uencing the declining pattern of hours worked in Japan. Second, consumption
tax and subsidy have a limited role in explaining the labor supply because they
cancel each other out. Third, pension bene¯t may in°uence the retirement of the
people in their sixties but has a minor e®ect on the hours worked. Fourth, the legal
reduction in the workweek length in 1990 can explain the low level of the hours
worked since 1990. Fifth, subsistence consumption can account for the slope of
hours worked but cannot explain the long-run level.
Keywords: marginal tax rate, subsidy, hours worked, pension bene¯t
JEL classi¯cation: E24; E32
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1 Introduction
The number of hours worked in the postwar Japanese economy has been dramatically
decreasing consistently. The left panel in Figure 1 shows the hours worked between 1960
and 2000. Japan experienced a decline of more than 30 percent during this period. The
objective of this paper is to ¯nd the main factors explaining the decreasing patterns
observed in the data.
Figure 1: Hours Worked and Capital Stocks in the Postwar Japanese Economy
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
30
35
40
45
Hours Worked
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
2
4
6
8
10
12
Capital Stocks
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
y
e
n
Note: The hours worked is measured by multiplying the average weekly hours with the employment
rate. The employment rate is the fraction of workers in the population aged 20-69. The aggregate
capital stock is divided by the GNP de°ator and the working-age population. Following Hayashi and
Prescott (2002), the aggregate capital stock is measured by summing the stock of the corporate sector
and non-corporate sector, and the foreign capital.
A good starting point is to compare the economic conditions in the 1950s with those
in the 2000s, based on a simple growth model. For example, King, Plosser, and Rebelo
(1988) argue that in an economy with low initial capital, there are three e®ects that
in°uence labor supply: (i) the initial wealth is low relative to its steady state level, (ii)
the marginal product of labor is low relative to the stationary level, and (iii) the marginal
product of capital is relatively high. The ¯rst and third factors induce the household to
work additional hours while the second factor exerts the opposite in°uence. They show
that the hours worked are relatively higher than the steady state level in a standard
growth model because the ¯rst and third factors dominate before reaching the steady
state. The right panel in Figure 1 displays the sequence of capital stocks in the postwar
period. The capital stock in 1960 is less than 10 percent of the level in 2000.1
The second apporach to explain the historical movements of macro variables including
the hours worked is total factor productivity (TFP). Chen, _Imrohorog¸lu, and _Imrohorog¸lu
(2006, hereafter CII) ¯nd that the Japanese saving rates in the postwar economy are
attributed to the time-varying growth rates of TFP as well as the low initially capital
levels.2 In their model, the time-varying TFP growth rates and the low initial stocks of
capital successfully explain most of the postwar savings variation: the high level of savings
in the 1960s and its decreasing pattern. However, as we will show in the latter sections,
their model fails to replicate the decreasing pattern of hours worked. This indicates that
the time-varying TFP and low initial capital levels are not extirely responsible.
What is the other factor that results in the decreasing pattern of labor supply?
Prescott (2004) ¯nds that the di®erences in the hours worked are consistent with the
1For example, Christiano (1989) and King and Rebelo (1993) also focus on the low initial stocks of
capital in the postwar Japanese economy.
2Hayashi and Prescott (2002, hereafter HP) also argue that the decline in technology explains the
lost decade in Japan, in particular, the output decline.
2
di®erences in labor income taxes and consumption taxes across time and G7 countries.
Ohanian, Ra®o, and Rogerson (2008, hereafter ORR) extend Prescott's work to 15 OECD
countries and more time periods. They also ¯nd that di®erences in hours worked are
consistent with di®erences in labor taxes and consumption taxes across time and the 15
OECD countries. Extending Prescott's work, Miyazawa (2010) ¯nds that pension bene¯t
plays an important role in explaining Japanese labor supply. However, they have some
caveats. They calculated the tax e®ect using only the static intra-temporal equation of
the household, and hence, cannot fully discuss the dynamic inter-temporal e®ect or the
indirect e®ects from other sources in the general equilibrium model.
Otsu (2009) criticizes their results because the measured labor wedge in Japan hardly
¯ts the sequence of the labor income tax. Instead, introducing the Stone-Geary utility
function into the dynamic general equilibrium model, he ¯nds that the decline in labor
during the rapid growth period can be attributed to an income e®ect.3 The households
with high subsistence consumption level try to keep their minimum level of consumption.
Therefore, they prefer working to enjoying leisure when their income levels are low.
In this paper, we show that the Japanese government's behaviors depressed the labor
supply in the postwar Japanese economy. To accomplish this task, we extend the existing
literature in several ways. First, rather than focusing only on the static ¯rst-order condi-
tion like Prescott (2004) and ORR (2008), we solve an entire model given the exogenous
sequences of ¯scal policy. In this spirit, we extend a standard optimal growth model of
CII (2006).4 In particular, we explicitly introduce government taxes such as labor income
tax and consumption tax. Second, the model incorporates government subsidies.56 In
the existing literature, government transfer was assumed to be delivered to households
only in the lump-sum form. In this paper, we separate government transfer into three
components: consumption subsidy, leisure subsidy, and lump-sum transfer. Third, I com-
pare the results of ORR (2008) and Otsu (2009), consolidating their key factors into our
general equilibrium model. We identify which factor is quantitatively more important
force between labor income tax and subsistence consumption.
The tax rates on factor incomes are taken from Gunji and Miyazaki (2011). Prescott
(2004) assumed that the marginal tax rates in Japan are 1.6 times as large as the average
tax rates. Kunieda (2010) criticizes that the marginal tax rates do not deviate much.
Furthermore, the past works that identi¯ed the detrimental factor of the Japanese econ-
omy in the 1990s and the 2000s used average tax rates instead of marginal tax rates.7
Therefore, Gunji and Miyazaki (2011) estimate the average marginal tax rates on the
factor incomes in Japan from 1963 to the recent period. I use their tax rates on labor
and capital incomes.
3Braun, Ikeda, and Joines (2008) introduce another important factor: the change in family scale.
Using an overlapping generations model, they show that the decline in family sizes increases the repre-
sentative family's utility weight on leisure relative to average consumption.
4CII (2006) only introduce the capital income tax in their model and assume that the other government
revenues come from the lump-sum tax.
5With a slight abuse of notation, we use the terms \subsidy" and \transfer" interchangably in this pa-
per. Thus in the de¯nition of subsidy, we include government transfers such as national health insurance,
laborer's insurance, and pensions.
6 _Imrohorog¸lu and Sudo (2010) explicitly introduce many kinds of taxes but they degenerate labor
supply and do not include government subsidies.
7For example, HP (2002).
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The main ¯ndings are as follows. First, the changing dynamics of government taxes
and subsidies have actually lowered the hours worked in the postwar Japanese economy.
Second, among these changes, the increasing sequence of labor income taxes is quantita-
tively the most important factor in explaining the decreasing path of labor supply. Third,
leisure subsidies such as unemployment compensation play a negligible role because of the
relatively small volume. Fourth, the tax and subsidy on consumption expenditure cancel
each other out, and seem to not have a direct relationship with the decreasing pattern of
labor supply. Overall, our simulation of the hours worked in the benchmark model can
capture the decreasing pattern of actual hours, though there is a slight discrepancy in
the 1950s.
In the robustness check, we conduct three additional experiments. First, we consider
the retirement hehavior and pension bene¯t of the old generation. In the benchmark
case, we assume that the public bene¯t is transfered to the households in the lump-sum
form. We relax this assumption and allow the people in their 60s to quit jobs when the
pension bene¯t increases. In the second experiment, following HP (2002), we introduce
the reduction in the workweek length in 1990 in our model. We ¯nd that the pension
bene¯t e®ect is minor, while the law e®ect is sizable. Third, we ¯nd that the relatively
high level of hours worked in the 1960s can be explained by the income e®ect as discussed
by Otsu (2009). Subsistence consumption can account for the slope of hours worked but
cannot explain the actual level especially in the long run.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 explains
the data and calibration. Section 4 displays the benchmark results. Section 5 does a
robustness check. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
To compare our result with that of the existing literature such as CII (2006), we use
the same type of a Cass-Koopmans growth model as used by these works. There is no
di®erence between investment and savings because we assume a closed economy.
2.1 Technology
The representative ¯rm operates as per the constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function:
Yt = AtK
µ
tH
1¡µ
t = K
µ
t (A
1
1¡µ
t Ht)
1¡µ; (1)
where Yt is the aggregate output, Kt is the aggregate capital, and Ht(´ htNt) is the
aggregate labor input in date t.8 At and A
1
1¡µ
t denote the TFP and labor augmenting
technology, respectively. The growth rate of labor augmenting technology is de¯ned as
°t ´ (At+1=At)
1
(1¡µ) . The output share of capital is µ. The capital stock evolves according
to the law of motion:
Kt+1 = (1¡ ±t)Kt +Xt; (2)
8ht denotes the hours worked per working-age-person. It can be divided into the average weekly
working hours and employment rate. However, this paper focuses on the decreasing pattern of the hours
worked per working-age-person as a whole.
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where Xt is the aggregate investment and ±t is the depreciation rate of capital at time t.
To produce output, the ¯rm rents capital and labor from the household. The maxi-
mization of pro¯ts yields the following factor prices:
rt = µAtK
µ¡1
t H
1¡µ
t ; (3)
wt = (1¡ µ)AtKµtH¡µt : (4)
2.2 Household
The utility function of the representative household is given by
1X
t=0
¯tNt
·
log (ct ¡ ¹c) + » log (T ¡ ht)
¸
; (5)
where ¯ 2 (0; 1) is a subjective discount factor and Nt denotes the working population in
date t. ct denotes the consumption in date t and ¹c is the subsistence level of consumption.
T denotes the total hours and ht is the labor supply.
The purchase of consumption-service is ¯nanced by the incomes on labor and capital,
the government lump-sum transfer, and subsidies. The °ow budget constraint for all t is
given by
(1 + ¿c;t ¡ sc;t)ctNt +Xt =
(1¡ ¿h;t)wthtNt + rtKt ¡ ¿k;t(rt ¡ ±t)Kt + TRt ¡ ¿tNt + sh;t(T ¡ ht)Nt; (6)
where ¿c;t, ¿h;t, and ¿k;t denote the tax rates on consumption, labor and capital income,
respectively, in date t. ¿t is the lump-sum tax whereas TRt is the aggregate lump-sum
transfer. sc;t and sh;t are the subsidy rates on consumption and leisure, respectively.
2.3 Government
The government imposes taxes on consumption and income from labor and capital along
with a tax on lump-sum, and ¯nances the exogenous streams of government purchases
Gt, the lump-sum transfer TRt, and the subsidies on consumption sc;tCt and leisure
sh;t(TNt ¡Ht). Therefore, the government budget constraint in date t is as follows:
Gt + TRt + sc;tCt + sh;t(TNt ¡Ht) = ¿h;twtHt + ¿k;t(rt ¡ ±t)Kt + ¿c;tCt + ¿tNt: (7)
2.4 Competitive Equilibrium
Given the government's ¯scal policy fGt; TRt; sc;t; sh;t; ¿h;t; ¿k;t; ¿c;t; ¿tg1t=0, a competitive
equilibrium consists of a set of allocations fCt; Ht; Xt; Kt+1; Ytg and prices fwt; rtg such
that (i) the allocation solves the household's problem, (ii) the allocation solves the ¯rm's
pro¯t maximization problem given the prices, (iii) the government budget is satis¯ed,
and (iv) the goods market clears: Ct +Xt +Gt = Yt.
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3 Data and Calibration
We calibrate the model to the Japanese economy using the data provided by HP (2002) for
the major variables.9 Our simulation considers the actual capital output ratio in the initial
period.10 We use the data for the actual time path of the TFP and the population growth
rates, depreciation rates, and government expenditure share. Following CII (2006), we
set four parameters time-invariantly: the capital share of output, µ, the subjective time
discount factor, ¯, the total discretionary hours in a week, T , and the share of leisure in
the utility function, ».
3.1 Government Data
The actual subsidy data are obtained from 68SNA and 93SNA. The components of each
subsidy are listed in Tables 1 and 2. Health insurances forms the biggest component
of the consumption subsidies.11 Unemployment compensation is included in the leisure
subsidies. We use the information of the proportions among the total subsidy because
we only have a ¯scal-year data for each components. We assume that these fractions are
the same as those for the calendar-year data.12
Table 1. Consumption Subsidy: sc;tCt
Health insurance and day laborers' health insurance
+ National health insurance
+ Old-age medical care
+ Health insurance run by private mutual associations
+ Children allowances
Data sources: 68SNA and 93SNA
Table 2. Leisure Subsidy: sh;t(T ¡ ht)Nt
Laborers' insurance
- Workmen's accident compensation insurance
Data sources: 68SNA and 93SNA
The tax rates on factor incomes are taken from Gunji and Miyazaki (2011).13 The
consumption tax rates are obtained from Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994).14
Figure 2 compares the capital income tax rates in Gunji and Miyazaki (2011) and
Mendoza et al. (1994). CII (2006) and many other previous studies use the average tax
rates taken from Mendoza et al. (1994). HP (2002) constantly set tax rates for capital
incomes to 0.48. Esteban-Pretel et al. (2010) also set constant labor and capital income
9I updated some data following HP (2008).
10As the starting value for 1956, we take 0.77 for the capital-output ratio inclusive of the foreign
capital, while CII (2006) take 1.37 exclusive of the foreign capital. There is a slight change in the saving
rates in the 1950s and the 1960s. However, the main results are not a®ected by these two initial values.
11As discussed by Rogerson (2006), health insurance can be considered as a consumption subsidy
because hospital burdens lower consumption expenditure.
12The total subsidy is de¯ned as social security bene¯ts. The inclusion of social assistance grants and
unfunded employee welfare bene¯ts does not change the result.
13The data can be downloaded as Excel ¯les from their website.
14They only cover years 1965-1996. Following CII (2006), we assume that the tax rates for 1956 and
1964 equal their values in 1965 and that those for the 1997 and 2000 tax rates equal their values in 1996.
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tax rates as 0.28 and 0.44. In these existing works, average tax rates were used in stead
of marginal tax rates. Prescott (2004) assumes that the marginal tax rate is 1.6 times
the average tax rate. In our model, we use marginal tax rates estimated by Gunji and
Miyazaki (2011) because marginal tax rates are consistent with the model. Figure 2
shows that the average marginal tax rates in Gunji and Miyazaki (2011) are higher than
the average tax rates. In particular, there is a bigger gap in the 1960s than in the 1990s.
Both curves are increasing in the sample period.
Figure 2: Capital Income Tax Rates
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Figure 3: Taxes and Subsidies for Labor Income and Consumption
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Figure 3 shows the taxes and subsidies on labor income and consumption expenditure.
The average marginal tax rate on labor income starts to increase in the mid-1970s. This
is because the social security burden increased in this period. The consumption tax
7
rate is stable at around 5 percent. If we detrend the government subsidies, sc;tCt and
sh;t(TNt ¡Ht), it becomes
sc;tct
A
1
1¡µ
t
= sc;t~ct; (8)
sh;t(T ¡ ht)
A
1
1¡µ
t
= ~sh;t(T ¡ ht); (9)
where ~sh;t ´ sh;t=A
1
1¡µ
t .
15 The consumption subsidy is increasing because the amount of
health insurance has risen. The leisure subsidy is also increasing throughout the sample
period but the relative size is small. Furthermore, its volume is detrended by the TFP
factor.
3.2 Subsistence Level
For subsistence consumption, a range of values have been assumed in the existing liter-
ature. For example, ORR (2008) and Christiano (1989) respectively set the subsistence
level as 10 and 60 percent of the steady state consumption level. HP (2008) set the
same as 85 percent of the agriculture consumption in 1985 in their analysis of the prewar
Japanese economy. King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1993) set the value as 90 percent of the
initial output. In our benchmark model, we follow Otsu (2009) who set the subsistence
level in 1952 as 35 percent of the steady state consumption.
In the benchmark simulation, we use the actual time series data of tax rates and
subsidies, and compare it with the arti¯cial path under counterfactual simulations. If
the subsidies on consumption and leisure are de¯ned to be zero, it means that they are
considered as lump-sum transfers. The following sections present the main numerical
results. First, we show our benchmark results with various taxes and subsidies, and
compare with the ¯ndings obtained in the existing literature. Second, as a counterfactual
experiment, we conduct several simulations of partially taxed or subsidized cases.
4 Quantitative Findings
In this section, we present our main result with government taxes and subsidies. A
comparison with CII (2006) is also made. Figure 4 displays the hours worked. The gray
dashed line indicates the actual data. The red dash-dotted line is our benchmark result
while the blue line is the result of CII (2006). Compared to CII (2006), we can observe
more decreasing patterns of the hours worked in our benchmark model. This is mainly
due to the fact that the explicit incorporation of taxes and subsidies lowers the steady
state level of the hours worked. However, our simulated levels for the hours worked have
some limitations with regard to explaining the actual data. The actual data shows a
more steep slope until the mid-1970s, while the simulated path reaches the same level in
the early 1980s. Moreover, the actual path shows a decline again in 1990. The historical
events related to working hours reduction are a possibility, but are not considered in the
15For further details of detrending, see Appendix A.
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benchmark model. For example, the adoption of ¯ve- or six-day workweek had spread by
1974.16 Between 1988 and 1993, the number of hours worked was legally reduced.17
Figure 4: Hours Worked
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Figure 5 shows output, capital, consumption, and saving rate between 1960 and 2000.
Figure 5: Benchmark Results
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Note: All macro variables are in terms of per working-age-person, divided by the GNP de°ator and the
working population. The de¯ntion of the savings is the same as CII (2006).
16For details, see Watanabe (2006).
17For more discussion, see HP (2002).
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The benchmark model captures the movements of the output and consumption more
accurately than CII (2006) in all sample periods. Slight discrepancies between the data
and benchmark results are seen in the 1970s and 1980s.18 The model-generated output
and consumption closely follow the actual data movements in the 1990s. Again, one of
the main reasons is that distortionary taxes and subsidies lower the steady state and
bring it close to the actual data series. Simulated capital closely follows the data until
the early 1980s but became lower from then onwards. This is because the marginal tax
rate on capital income is high. The saving rates of the two models are almost the same.
5 Counterfactual Simulation
In the previous subsection, we con¯rmed that the taxes and subsidies are important in
explaining the decreasing pattern of hours worked. Now, we assess the relative importance
of each tax and subsidy in explaining the decreasing pattern of hours worked. The
analysis is conducted with the following modi¯cations: (i) tax on labor income and leisure
subsidy are excluded from the benchmark model and (ii) tax and subsidy on consumption
expenditure are excluded from the benchmark model. These counterfactual experiments
can identify which factor contributes the most to the benchmark result.
5.1 Importance of Consumption Tax and Subsidy
The ¯rst counter-factual simulation involves neither labor income tax nor leisure sub-
sidy: ¿h;t = sh;t = 0 for all t. Figure 6 displays the hours worked with counterfactual
simulations.
Figure 6: Counterfactual Simulation
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Note: ¿h;t is the time-varying labor income tax rate. ¿c is the consumption tax rate. ~sh is the
detrended leisure subsidy. sc is the consumption subsidy.
18HP (2002) show that the TFP contribution to the output is the lowest in 1973 and 1983.
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There are two additional ¯ndings. First, neither consumpton tax nor consumption
subsidy can explain the actual level of hours worked. In particular, the simulated level
in 2000 deviates from the actual level by more then 10 hours. This is because the
consumption tax and subsidy do not distort the Euler equation in the long run. Second,
consumption tax and subsidy have opposite e®ects and cancel each other out. The actual
volumes of consumption tax and subsidy are almost the same from the mid-1970s.
5.2 Importance of Labor Income Tax and Leisure Subsidy
The second counter-factual simulation involves neither consumption tax nor consumption
subsidy: ¿c;t = sc;t = 0 for all t. Figure 7 displays the hours worked with counterfactual
simulations.
Figure 7: Counterfactual Simulation
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Note: ¿h;t is the time-varying labor income tax rate. ¿c is the consumption tax rate. ~sh is the
detrended leisure subsidy. sc is the consumption subsidy.
The ¯gure yields at least two interesting ¯ndings. First, the increasing pattern of the
tax rates on labor income can explain most of the decreasing pattern of labor supply.
The tax rates on labor income in our model include the social security burden. Most of
the increasng pattern of labor income tax rates can be explained by the social security
burden, and hence, it is a crucial factor in the decreasing pattern of hours worked. Second,
the results are insensitive to leisure subsidy because the actual volume of leisure subsidy
is very limited.
6 Robustness Check
In this section, we explore the sensitivity of our results. First, we study the relationship
between retirement and pension bene¯t. Second, we incorporate the legal reduction in
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the workweek length in 1990. Third, we perform a sensitivity analysis of the subsistence
level of consumption.
6.1 Social Security and Retirement
Japan has been experiencing demographic changes. The Japanese working-age population
has been generally declining while the share of population in their 60s has been increasing.
Moreover, the labor force participation rate of these older persons has been lowered.
Figure 8 shows the increasing share of the people in their sixties among the 20 and 69
working-age population and the historical trend of the labor force participation rates by
age group from 1968 to 2000.
Figure 8: Pension and Retirement
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Note: The population data are taken from the Census. The labor force participation rate data are
taken from the Labor Force Survey.
The share of those aged sixty and above generally declined during this period. Social
security and retirement have a positive relationship.19 Hongawa and Mori (1981) estimate
that the elasticities of pension bene¯t to employment are between -0.15 and -0.291 for
the age group 60-64 and between -0.601 and -0.68 by age group 65-69.
As such, we study how important the retirment decision of the people in their sixties
is in accounting for the decreasing pattern in the sample period. Such people's retirement
directly lowers the hours worked and hence, the pension bene¯ts to them are assumed to
be leisure subisidy. Rather than using the elasticity from the previous literature, we allow
people aged 60 to 69 among the household members to respond to the pension bene¯t in
our model. The data sources for the additional leisure subsidy are reported in Table 3.
Table 3. Additional Leisure Subsidy: sh;t(T ¡ ht)Nt N60s;tNt
sh;t(T ¡ ht)Nt: Welfare pension
+ National pension
+ Laborers' insurance
- Workmen's accident compensation insurance
+ Seamen's insurance
+ Mutual bene¯t association
+ Pension Funds
- Funds for casualty compensation
N60s;t Population of the people in their sixties
19For example, see Oshio and Yashiro (1999).
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Data sources: 68SNA and 93SNA, Labor Force Survey, Tachibanaki and Shimono (1994), Yamagami
(1996). I calculated the additional leisure subsidies by two age groups, 60 to 64 and 65 to 69. This is
because the elasticity of employment probability to pensions is di®erent.
Figure 9: Pension and Hours Worked
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As we can see in Figure 9, the retirement e®ect of pension bene¯t does not generate a
signi¯cant change in the hours worked in the Japanese economy. We can observe that the
hours worked decreased slightly in the latter period than in the benchmark case. This
result indicates that pension bene¯t may a®ect the retirement decision of the people in
their sixties but the aggregate impact is not necessarily large.
6.2 Revisiting HP (2002)
HP (2002) examine the Japanese economic stagnation in the 1990s. Besides the low
productivity growth rate, they also consider the reduction in the workweek length from
44 hours to 40 hours between 1988 and 1993, called Jitan, brought about by the 1988
revision of the Labor Standards Law. The reduction in working days from six to ¯ve
changed the aggregate variables including the hours worked. To analyse the e®ect of
this law, HP (2002) divide hours worked into two parts: average working hours and
employment rate. They assume that labor is indivisible and hence, a person either works
or does not work at all. When the average working hours remained near 40, we can take
a linear approximation of labor disutility around h = 40. Thus, we incorporate the e®ect
of this law in the 1990s following HP (2002).20
Figure 10 displays the law e®ect. As discussed in HP (2002), Figure 10 indicates that
the reduction in workweek length with shortened working hours is important to account
for the shift in the hours worked in the 1990s.
20The simulation is conducted as follows. The economy solves the problem as in the benchmark case.
In the early 1990, there is a sudden reduction in the workweek length. Thus, the households and ¯rms
reoptimize to converge to the new steady state. For further details of the model from 1990, see HP
(2002).
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Figure 10: Reduction in the Workweek Length
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6.3 Income E®ect
Otsu (2009) insists that taxes may be not the main force in°uencing labor decline in
Japan. Calculating the labor wedge through business cycle accounting, he shows that
the sequences of taxes and labor wedge are rather di®erent. He shows that the model
with Stone-Geary preferences can explain the labor decline during the rapid growth period
through the strong income e®ects generated from the TFP growth and intratemporal non-
homotheticity in consumption and leisure. Therefore, to examine the role of subsistence
level in our model, we re-simulate the model for di®erent subsistence levels.
Figure 11: Hours Worked with Various Subsistence Levels
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Figure 11 displays the results under various subsistence levels. In all cases, the hours
worked converges to the zero subsistence consumption case. More importantly, the e®ect
in the short run can be huge when the wealth is very low. Thus, the subsistence level of
consumption may be important especially when explaining the observations in the 1960s.
Why does this happen?21 This is because the steady state value is the same as in
CII (2006). The detrended equilbrium conditions with the Stone-Geary utility function
become
~ct+1 ¡ ~¹ct
~ct ¡ ~¹ct =
(1 + ¿c;t ¡ sc;t)
(1 + ¿c;t+1 ¡ sc;t+1)°t¯[1 + (1¡ ¿k;t+1)(µ·
µ¡1
t+1 ¡ ±t+1)]; (10)
»(~ct ¡ ~¹ct)
T ¡ ht = (1¡ µ)·
µ
t
(1¡ ¿h;t)
(1 + ¿c;t)(1¡ sc;t) ¡ ~sh;t; (11)
where ~¹ct = ¹c=A
1
1¡µ
t . The intra-temporal equation as well as the Euler equation are now
in°uenced by the subsistence level. Note that ~¹ct converges to zero because the denomi-
nator is time-increasing. Therefore, the household does not care about ~¹ct in the long run,
and consumption converges to the steady state level of CII (2006).
7 Concluding Remarks
We have studied the role of government subsidies and taxation on the hours worked
in the standard neo-classical growth model. In the presence of increasing sequences
of labor-income tax, lump-sum transfer, and several subsidies, the labor supply may
decrease. Hence, the government may have a close relationship with the labor market.
The fundamental contribution of this paper is as follows. First, from the simulation of a
general equilibrium model, we ¯nd that the increasing pattern of taxation on labor income
actually leads to the decreasing pattern of the hours worked. Second, the expenditure
on social security such as unemployment subsidy played a negligible role because of its
small size. Third, we ¯nd a small contribution of taxes and subsidy on consumption on
the hours worked because they cancel each other out.
We also perform three robustness checks: (i) the relationship between retirement
and pension bene¯t, (ii) the law-enforced reduction in workweek length, and (iii) the
sensitivity of subsistent consumption level. I ¯nd that legal reduction can explain large
proportion of hours worked in the 1990s but pension bene¯t has a minor role. Moreover,
we ¯nd that the subsistence level alone cannot explain the long-run level of hours worked.
There are several remaining issues that need to be resolved in the future. First, in
this paper, we only focus on the supply side. The demand side or labor market struc-
tures can in°uence the hours worked.22 Second, our representative household model
cannot explain the inter-generational e®ect. The intergenerational e®ects including pen-
sion problems may have important role especially in the future. Third, the anticipation
21Otsu (2009) has two major di®erences from our model. First, there is no government in his model. For
example, consumption in his model consists of government as well as private consumption. Government
investment is also included in the gross domestic capital formation. Second, the simulation method is
di®erent. He uses the method of undetermined coe±cients to compute the linear decision rules of the
detrended endogenous variables.
22Esteban-Pretel, Nakajima, and Tanaka (2010) analyze the demand side of labor market with search
frictions. However, working hours are exogenous in their model.
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impacts of taxation and subsidies may be important. For example, Watanabe, Watan-
abe, and Watanabe (2001) ¯nd that 80 percent of the Japanese consumers respond tax
changes at the time of their implementation and not at the time of policy announcement.
Future work should analyze how these additional factors can account for the unexplained
parts.
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Appendix A: Equilibrium Conditions
For convenience, if we de¯ne ·t ´ Kt
A
1
1¡µ
t Ht
= kt
A
1
1¡µ
t ht
, the capital return and wage rates
are given as
rt = µ·
µ¡1
t ; (12)
wt = (1¡ µ)A
1
1¡µ
t ·
µ
t : (13)
Optimal allocation and implication
The ¯rst-order conditions of the representative household are as follows
ct+1 ¡ ¹c
ct ¡ ¹c =
(1 + ¿c;t ¡ sc;t)
(1 + ¿c;t+1 ¡ sc;t+1)¯[1 + (1¡ ¿k;t+1)(µ·
µ¡1
t+1 ¡ ±t+1)]; (14)
»(ct ¡ ¹c)
T ¡ ht = wt
(1¡ ¿h;t)
(1 + ¿c;t ¡ sc;t) ¡ sh;t; (15)
lim
t!1
¸t¯
tkt = 0: (16)
The resource constraint becomes
Kt+1 = (1¡ ±t)Kt + (1¡ªt)AtKµtH1¡µt ¡ Ct; (17)
where ªt ´ GtYt .
We consider a transition from the given condition to a balanced growth path at which
the per working-age-person variables grow at the rate A
1
(1¡µ)
t . For an aggregate variable
Zt, its detrended version is given by ~zt =
Zt
A
1
1¡µNt
. The equilbrium conditions become23
~ct+1 ¡ ~¹ct+1
~ct ¡ ~¹ct =
(1 + ¿c;t ¡ sc;t)
°t(1 + ¿c;t+1 ¡ sc;t+1)¯f1 + (1¡ ¿k;t+1)(µ·
µ¡1
t+1 ¡ ±t+1)g; (18)
~kt+1nt°t = [(1¡ ±t) + (1¡ªt)·µ¡1t ]~kt ¡ ~ct: (19)
»(~ct ¡ ~¹ct)
T ¡ ht = (1¡ µ)·
µ
t
(1¡ ¿h;t)
(1 + ¿c;t ¡ sc;t) ¡ ~sh;t: (20)
Appenidx B: Steady State
Are the characteristics in the steady state di®erent from that in the existing literature?
The equations (18), (19), and (20) in the steady state become
° = ¯f1 + (1¡ ¿k)(µ·µ¡1 ¡ ±)g; (21)
~kn° = [(1¡ ±) + (1¡ª)·µ¡1]~k ¡ ~c: (22)
»~c
T ¡ h = (1¡ µ)·
µ (1¡ ¿h)
(1 + ¿c ¡ sc) ¡ ~sh: (23)
23Since Yt =
µ
Kt
A
1
1¡µ
t Ht
¶µ¡1
Kt = ·µ¡1t Kt,
Yt
A
1
1¡µNt
= ·µ¡1t ~kt.
Alternatively ~yt = Yt
A
1
1¡µ
t Nt
= At
µ
Kt
A
1
1¡µNt
¶µ
H1¡µt
(A
1
1¡µ
t Nt)
1¡µ
= ~kµt h
1¡µ
t .
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The ¯rst and second equations are the same as in CII (2006). However, the intra-
temporal constraint is distorted by both the taxes on labor income and consumption
expenditure and the subsidies on leisure and consumption.
The right-hand side of equation (23) is increasing in the higher values of sc and
decreasing in the higher values of ¿h, ¿c, and ~sh. The left-hand side of equation (23)
determines the relative choice of consumption and leisure. Therefore, if the government
imposes higher taxes on labor income and consumption expenditure or provides a bigger
subsidy on leisure, the household chooses leisure rather than consumption in the long
run. This is quite unlike the lump-sum tax and transfer.
Appendix C: Equilibrium Conditions under the Economy as Con-
sidered in HP (2002)
In the spirit of HP (2002), we incorporate the reduction in working hours to around 40
hours and the decrease in days of work. We assume that the labor disutility can be
written as follows:
gt(lt; zt)et; (24)
where gt(lt; zt) is the distutility of labor dependent on working hours, lt, and days of work,
zt, and et is the employment rate. The intra-temporal condition of the representative
household is thus given as follow
gt(lt; zt)(ct ¡ ¹c) = wt (1¡ ¿h;t)
(1 + ¿c;t ¡ sc;t) lt ¡ sh;tlt: (25)
If we consider the assumption made by HP (2002), the disutility function becomes
gt(lt; zt) =
®
40
lt. Following HP (2002), we also assume that the steady state is in°uenced
by the reduction in the workweek length. We calibrate ® such that the steady state level
of hours worked is 30 hours. Consequently, detrended equilbrium conditions become
®
40
(~ct ¡ ~¹ct) = (1¡ µ)·µt
(1¡ ¿h;t)
(1 + ¿c;t ¡ sc;t) ¡ ~sh;t: (26)
Therefore,
·t =
½·
®
40
(~ct ¡ ~¹ct) + ~sh;t
¸
(1 + ¿c;t ¡ sc;t)
(1¡ µ)(1¡ ¿h;t)
¾ 1
µ
: (27)
The inter-temporal condition and the resource constraint are the same as before:
~ct+1 ¡ ~¹ct+1
~ct ¡ ~¹ct =
(1 + ¿c;t ¡ sc;t)
°t(1 + ¿c;t+1 ¡ sc;t+1)¯f1 + (1¡ ¿k;t+1)(µ·
µ¡1
t+1 ¡ ±t+1)g; (28)
~kt+1nt°t = [(1¡ ±t) + (1¡ªt)·µ¡1t ]~kt ¡ ~ct: (29)
Simulation
Since 1956, the economy solves the benchmark model. In 1990, there is a sudden ex-
ogenous reduction in the work week length. The economy evolves under this changed
scenario. The simulation is conducted until the path converges to the new steady state.
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